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therefore, that the Court will take the earliest opportunity to clarify the extent to which statutory tenure rights may be waived in an
initial employment agreement.
Thomas A. Leghorn
LABOR LAW

Labor Law § 222: Held violative of privileges and immunities
clause
The privileges and immunities clause of the United States
Constitution guarantees to "[t]he citizens of each State . . . all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."" Notcould be used facilely to avoid ever giving tenure. The tenure statutes are intended to protect the teacher and not become a trap to those not guileful to avoid it." Baer v. Nyquist, 34
N.Y.2d 291, 299, 313 N.E.2d 751, 755, 357 N.Y.S.2d 442, 448 (1974); see, e.g., Board of Educ.
v. Ambach, 69 App. Div. 2d 949, 415 N.Y.S.2d 496 (3d Dep't 1979).
64 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2. The purpose of the privileges and immunities clause
was to
unify a nation of independent sovereign states by eliminating destructive intrastate rivalry
and competition. Knox, ProspectiveApplications of the Article IV Privileges and Immuhities Clause of the United States Constitution,43 Mo. L. REv. 1, 7 (1978); see Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 6-32, at 404-05 (1978).
Although similar language appears in the fourteenth amendment, see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, the provisions are not coextensive. The privileges and immunities clause of
article IV precludes a state from denying to nonresidents certain rights accorded residents,
while the fourteenth amendment clause protects from state encroachment rights arising
from federal citizenship. For a general comparison of the two provisions, see L. TRIBE,
supra, § 7-2 at 416-17.
Early cases construing the provision viewed the privileges and immunities clause as a
source for affording federal protection to the natural or fundamental rights of state citizenship. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). It was not
long, however, before the Court rejected this attempt to incorporate the natural rights doctrine into the Constitution, adopting instead the position that the clause was intended
merely to prohibit discriminatory legislation aimed at nonresidents. See Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872); L. TRIBE, supra, § 6-32, at 406. Accordingly, defining
fundamental rights was relegated to a subordinate position and the initial inquiry became
whether those fundamental rights which a state did grant its own citizens were granted or
denied to citizens of another state. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872).
Under this view, a state could deny fundamental rights to citizens of different states if such
rights were also denied to the state's own citizens. L. TRIBE, supra, § 6-32, at 407.
Much later, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), this comparative standard was
supplanted by the substantial reason test. In Toomer, the Supreme Court determined that
the protection afforded nonresidents by the privileges and immunities clause was not absolute and hence did not preclude discrimination in all cases, but only in those where the
discrimination could not be reasonably and substantially justified. Id. at 396. Notably, however, the Supreme Court recently has held that the substantial reason test, enunciated in
Toomer, does not alter the general rule that only fundamental rights accorded state citizens
need be granted to nonresidents. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
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withstanding this broad language, where a state owned or had created a particular resource, disparate treatment of nonresidents
with respect to that resource has frequently survived constitutional
challenge under the privileges and immunities clause. 5 Recently,
however, in Salla v. County of Monroe,6 the Court of Appeals
struck down section 222 of the Labor Law, 7 holding that the privileges and immunities clause prohibits New York from statutorily
extracting contract terms which mandate the employment of its residents on public works projects.6
Lisbon Contractors, Inc. (Lisbon) was a Pennsylvania corporation that contracted to build a sewer line for Monroe County, a
371, 387-88 (1978).
65

See, e.g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546

(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Predicated upon the conception of a state's sovereignty
over its natural resources, the ownership exception to the privileges and immunities clause
was first promulgated in Corfield. In Corfield, the court, although acknowledging that the
right to work in any state is fundamental, nevertheless concluded that access to the state's
oyster beds could be restricted to citizens of the state. Id. at 552. In McCready, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Corfield, holding that a Virginia statute prohibiting
noncitizens from planting oysters in the state's tidal waters did not violate the privileges
and immunities clause. 94 U.S. at 396. The Court stated that a state citizen's right to plant
oysters was a "property" right arising not as "a privilege or immunity of general citizenship
but of special citizenship" and, consequently, was beyond the purview of the clause. Id.
More recently, in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), wherein a state statute limiting abortions to state residents was struck down as violative of the privileges and immunities clause,
the Court implied that its decision might have been different if the statute had been premised upon the narrow policy of preserving state-financed medical facilities for the benefit
of its citizens. Id. at 200. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 64, ch. 6, § 7, at 38-39 (Supp.
1979); Knox, supra note 64, at 21; see also Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349 (1908); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
Clearly, however, the ownership exception is not pervasive. See generally Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). The Supreme Court recently has noted that "the States' interest in regulating and controlling those things they claim to 'own'. . . is by no means absolute." Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385 (1978); see Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529 (1978).
88 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), aft'g, 64 App. Div. 2d 437,
409 N.Y.S.2d 903 (4th Dep't 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1836 (1980).
67 Section 222 provides in pertinent part:
In construction of public works by the state, a municipal subdivision . . . or
any agency entering into public works projects providing for the expenditure of
public money or by persons contracting with the state, a municipal subdivision
. . . or any agency entering into public works projects providing for the expenditure of public money, preference in employment shall be given to citizens of the
state of New York who have been residents of the state for at least twelve consecutive months immediately prior to the commencement of their new employment.
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 222 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
68 48 N.Y.2d at 525, 399 N.E.2d at 915, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883-84.
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project funded principally by the federal government.6 9 David
Salla and Robert Keppley, two of Lisbon's equipment operators,
and Pennsylvania residents, were laid off pursuant to the county's
demand that Lisbon comply with section 222, New York's resident-hire law. 0 Thereafter, the employer and interested employees
joined in obtaining a declaration that section 222 was unconstitutional and an order enjoining Monroe County from enforcing the
statute as incorporated in its contract with Lisbon.7 1 The trial
court premised its finding that section 222 was unconstitutional on
the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses as well as the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.7 2 A divided Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed on the grounds that
the privileges and immunities and commerce clauses had been
violated.7 3
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed, but predicated its affirmance solely on the privileges and immunities
clause. 7 4 Writing for the majority,75 Judge Fuchsberg rejected the

"

Although the project was 75 percent financed by federal funds allocated to the implementation of the Environmental Protection and Pure Water Acts of the United States, administration of the project was to be carried on by Monroe County and its Division of Pure
Waters. Id. at 519, 399 N.E.2d at 911, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
70 Id. Section 222 of the Labor Law, mandating preferential employment of New York
citizens, see note 67 supra, was incorporated into the contract between Lisbon and Monroe
County by a provision requiring Lisbon to comply with all local and state laws. 64 App. Div.
2d at 440, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 905. As a result of the county's insistence on strict compliance
with section 222, Salla and Keppley were released from their employment. They maintained
that as a consequence of job scheduling conflicts, they would be unemployed for several
months. 48 N.Y.2d at 519, 399 N.E.2d at 911, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
71 Id. at 519-20, 399 N.E.2d at 911, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 880. Pursuant to CPLR 1012(b),
Attorney General Robert Abrams intervened as a party defendant on behalf of the state in
support of the statute's constitutionality. Id.
72 Salla v. County of Monroe, 90 Misc. 2d 427, 395 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1977), afld, 64 App. Div. 2d 437, 409 N.Y.S.2d 903 (4th Dep't 1978), aff'd, 48
N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1836 (1980).
Special term held that New York's attempt to exclude noncitizens constituted economic
protectionism violative of the commerce clause. 90 Misc. 2d at 431, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 369, see
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Additionally, the court found section 222 to be an undue burden
on the plaintiff's fundamental rights to interstate travel and to pursue a livelihood and,
consequently, violative of equal protection principles. 90 Misc. 2d at 428, 395 N.Y.S.2d at
367; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73 64 App. Div. 2d at 445, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The Fourth Department, finding that
section 222 violated both the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clauses,
found it unnecessary to consider whether the statute violated the equal protection clause.
Id. at 445, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
74 48 N.Y.2d at 520, 399 N.E.2d at 911, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
75 Judge Fuchsberg was joined in his opinion by Judges Jasen, Wachtler, Jones and
Meyer. Judge Gabrielli dissented in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Cooke
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defendants' contention that the state's "ownership" of the resource, the public works project, was sufficient in and of itself to
justify the discriminatory hiring mandate,7 noting that in light of
developments in article IV jurisprudence that factor was no longer
dispositive.7 Rather, in passing upon the constitutionality of the
statute, the Court applied a two-prong test formulated by the
United States Supreme Court 8 to determine first whether "valid
independent reasons" for discriminating against nonresidents existed and further whether the disparate treatment was justified by
a "close relationship" to the reasons advanced. 79 Although apparently persuaded that the state's legitimate interest in reducing unemployment was sufficient to satisfy the threshold inquiry, 0 the
majority determined that the defendant failed to establish the requisite nexus between the operation of the statute and the alleviation of unemployment."1 Indeed, the Court emphasized, there was
no indication that the employment of nonresidents on public works
projects had any appreciable effect on New York's unemployment
rate.8 2 Consequently, the Court concluded that a nonresident's
right to pursue his livelihood in New York outweighed any benefits
accruing to the state from its statutorily mandated preferential
hiring policies.8 3
Employing commerce clause principles,8 4 Judge Gabrielli disconcurred.
78 48 N.Y.2d at 524, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883. While acknowledging that
the sewer line project could be viewed as a "local" concern, Judge Fuchsberg nevertheless
concluded that "constitutional concerns for the right of a citizen of one State to pursue his
vocation in another" outweighed any proprietary interest the state may have had. Id. at 525,
399 N.E.2d at 915, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
7
Id. at 524, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
78 See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); note 64 supra.
78 48 N.Y.2d at 522, 399 N.E.2d at 913, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 881-82.
8o Id. at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 913-14, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882. In applying the two-pronged
test of Toomer, the Sala majority made the preliminary determination that the right to
pursue a trade in a different state was "at the heart of the [privileges and immunities]
clause's guarantees." Id. at 522, 399 N.E.2d at 913, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
Id. at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
82 The Salla majority pointed out that there was no guarantee that the statute would
operate to reduce unemployment since qualified residents might be lured away from other
jobs to work on the project in question. Id. Additionally, the court noted, since the additional costs of integrating new personnel might be so burdensome as to preclude out-of-state
contractors from bidding on New York public work projects, the net effect of the statute
might be to restrict commercial intercourse among the states, thus defeating the purpose of
the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 524, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
83Id. at 525, 399 N.E.2d at 915, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
"' Since the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses were designed to promote
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sented, noting that while a state was constitutionally precluded
from utilizing its regulatory powers to discriminate against the
business interests of nonresidents, it was not prohibited from "using its spending powers to promote local industry or give its citizens a competitive edge."'85 Judge Gabrielli distinguished Hicklin
v. Orbeck,86 a recent Supreme Court case which had severely limited the states' ability to exploit their natural resources to obtain
preferential hiring for residents. 87 Although the "Alaska Hire"
statute in Hicklin extended to "all private employment generated
by activities within the state" arising from and incident to oil and
gas leases, the New York statute, the dissent noted, merely restricted hiring on construction contracts commissioned by the
state. 8 Judge Gabrielli posited that, although Alaska had slight if
any proprietary interest in the business transactions statutorily encompassed, New York evidenced precisely such interests by reason
of the expenditure of its own funds on public works construction. 9
Hence, while acknowledging that a state may not "exploit its passive ownership of a resource by indirectly using it as a basis for
requiring discrimination against nonresidents in private hiring,"
the dissent concluded that a state may exercise its contract bargaining power to limit to residents the employment opportunuties
created by public works spending.9 0
It is submitted that in finding the public creation of a resource
merely one factor to be considered in determining the validity of
New York's resident-hire statute under the privileges and immunities clause, the Court unnecessarily restricted the state's power to
contractually reserve to its citizens state-engendered employment
opportunities. While a state's ownership of a resource has been adjudged insufficient to insulate discriminatory practices against nonnational unity by obviating protectionist policies and interstate rivalries, similar considera-

tions come into play under both provisions. See Knox, supra note 64, at 18.
8548 N.Y.2d

at 526, 399 N.E.2d at 916, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85 (Gabrielli, J.,

dissenting).
'

437 U.S. 518 (1978).
In Hicklin, the Supreme Court held violative of the privileges and immunities clause

an Alaska resident-hire statute that mandated the preferential hiring of qualified Alaskan
residents by employers who had obtained oil and gas leases from the state. Id. at 526.
8348 N.Y.2d at 528, 399 N.E.2d at 917, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
Compare ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.030(a) (1977) with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 222 (McKinney Supp.
1979-1980).
8 48 N.Y.2d at 529, 399 N.E.2d at 917, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting);
see note 94 infra.

90 48 N.Y.2d at 529, 399 N.E.2d at 917, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
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residents from scrutiny under the privileges and immunities
clause, 91 it is clear that the presence of such a factor may dispositively establish that the disparate treatment is not violative of the
constitutional mandate.9 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently
indicated in Hicklin that, notwithstanding the failure to satisfy the
substantial reason test, a state's attempt to reserve for the benefit
of its citizens employment opporunities arising from a state-owned
resource will pass constitutional muster if the state additionally
possesses a sufficient proprietary interest in the resource.9 3 Hence,
it would seem that where, as in Salla, a state creates employment
opportunities in the form of public works projects, the requisite
proprietary interest exists prima facie and, therefore, justifies the
disparate treatment of nonresidents even though the discriminatory hiring practices are otherwise insufficiently related to a legiti94
mate state interest so as to satisfy the substantial reason test.
By failing to appreciate the continued viability of the public
9' See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528-29 (1978); Baldwin v. Montana Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385 (1978). See generally Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948).
92 See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). In Hicklin, the Supreme Court, explaining the extent to which a state's ownership of a resource would validate disparate treatment
of nonresidents, stated:
[A] State's ownership of the property with which the statute is concerned is a
factor-althoughoften the crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating whether
the statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates the [privileges and immunities] clause. Dispositive though this factor may be in many cases in which a
State discriminates against nonresidents, it is not dispositive here.
The reason is that Alaska has little or no proproprietary interest in much of
the activity swept within the ambit of Alaska Hire.
Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
93 See note 95 infra.

9' It is submitted that the Salla court failed to recognize the distinction between a state
bargaining for contracts to benefit its citizens when the state is interested in the funds spent
and the work accomplished on the one hand and a state dominating private contracts when
it is only tangentially related to the business transacted on the other. Indeed, it is settled
that where a resident-hire statute "extends to employers who have no connection whatsoever with the State's [resources], perform no work on state land, have no contractual reldtionship with the State, and receive no payment from the State," a state lacks the proprietary interest sufficient to justify disparate treatment of nonresidents. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
U.S. 518, 530 (1978). Such was not the situation in Salla, however, wherein Lisbon contracted with the state for work to be performed on state land and financed, at least in part,
with state funds. See note 69 and accompanying text supra. It is precisely this "ongoing
interest in and control over public works projects," which imbued the state with a "clear
and direct proprietary interest" therein, and which placed the statute beyond the prohibitions of the privileges and immunities clause. 48 N.Y.2d at 529, 399 N.E.2d at 917, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 886 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting); see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 388 (1978).
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ownership exception, it appears that the Salla Court has expanded
the scope of the privileges and immunities clause beyond that envisioned by the Supreme Court. 5 In the wake of Salla, it seems that
any attempt by the state to afford employment advantages to residents must unqualifiedly satisfy the substantial reason test.
Therefore, even though the Court suggested that a narrowly drawn
resident-hire statute might survive constitutional scrutiny,96 its
conclusion that nonresidents are not a peculiar source of New
York's unemployment problem precludes the satisfaction of the
substantial reason test and thus suggests that future resident-hire
legislation similarly will be found violative of the privileges and
immunities clause. 7
Robin E. Eichen
Wayne J. Keeley
PENAL LAW

Penal Law art. 140: Intent to commit specific object crime not
element of burglary prosecution and hence disclosure of specific
object crime not required in bill of particulars
To secure a conviction for burglary in New York, the prosecu" See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529 (1978). Although the most vigorous attack
on the proprietary interest exception was given in Toomer where it was referred to as a
"fiction," 334 U.S. at 402, the Court nevertheless articulated the need for a continued viable
predicate for state regulation in privileges and immunities cases: "The inquiry [in determining the validity of discrimination] must also, of course, be conducted with due regard for the
principle that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in
prescribing appropriate cures." Id. at 396.
" 48 N.Y.2d at 523-24, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882-83.
" The net effect of the Salla holding, it appears, is to deter viable state action in alleviating its unemployment problems. Such a result was criticized in C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd, 429 U.S. 1031 (1977), wherein a
three-judge court held section 222 unconstitutional on equal protection and due process
grounds with respect to aliens. Taking issue with the majority's reasoning, Judge Platt
stated:
[I]f the State of New York enacts legislation creating and funding additional jobs
and makes them available to all comers at a time when unemployment is widespread (as it is today) there will be an influx of non-New Yorkers, both citizens
and aliens, seeking such jobs and New York's desirable objective of eliminating
unemployment within its borders will have been frustrated and defeated despite
considerable taxpayer expense ....
[T]his course merely compounds, and in no
way alleviates, the problem which New York is legitimately and properly attempting to correct, and that it can only discourage New York and other states from
taking any action to reduce unemployment.
412 F. Supp. at 1174 (Platt, J., dissenting).

